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The language of ‘rights’ in the




The analysis of Aboriginal “property”
1 In an earlier article (Keen 2010) I looked at the ways in which Aboriginal “property”
was (mis)understood by English speaking observers from quite early in the colonial
period through to the present.  A concomitant of  the process of  the colonisation of
Australia  and  appropriation  of  Aboriginal  land  has  been  the  misrepresentation  of
Aboriginal  concepts  and  processes  of  relations  to  country.  Observers  interpreted
property, especially in relation to land and waters, as if it were akin to English land
tenure. I concluded as follows:
…[C]ommentators interpreted Aboriginal possessions not only in terms of the all-
encompassing concept of ‘property’, including personal possessions, land, wives (in
one view) and ‘incorporeal’ things, but also projecting English social structure onto
Aboriginal  social  relations.  The  tribe  is  the  equivalent  of  the  nation,  with  its
common language, territory (which the tribe defends) and body of custom. It  is
divided into family groups, each with an ‘eState’. In several accounts, individuals
inherit property in land from the father post mortem and pass it down to sons or to
other close relatives in the absence of sons. The ‘family’ is thus constituted as a
succession of individual landholders—reminiscent of aristocratic families holding
land in entail.  Radcliffe-Brown’s ‘horde’ with its property in land is in effect an
expanded family. Certain class elements are read into Aboriginal social relations in
interpretations  of  prominent  individuals  as  ‘chiefs’  (for  example,  Dawson 1881).
(The later ‘clan’ model introduces an element with a Scottish but not an English
equivalent.)
2 While both personal and real property were said to be held exclusively—especially land
at the level of tribe—they are not described in terms of commodities. The language of
commodities creeps in, however, when it comes to the exchange of moveable items,
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described  as  ‘trade’  or  ‘barter’.  After  all,  ‘trade’  was  a  synonym for  ‘commerce’  in
eighteenth-century England and contrasted with the landed interest.
3 [Thus] Aboriginal society—at least in its dimension of ‘property’—is depicted through
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a primitive form of English society.
Terms such as ‘tribe’ (from Latin tribus) and (later) ‘clan’ (adopted into Gaelic from
Latin planta) give the structure its exotic, primitive character—‘tribe’ used initially to
label elements of Hebrew society and clan to denote Scottish kin groups. It is only when
we come to Warner[‘s ethnography] (1937) that ‘property’ begins to be qualified and
the possessions of ‘clans’ are given a special status, more closely reflecting the kinds of
distinctions made by Aboriginal people themselves.
4 The  language  of  ‘rights’  has  dominated  anthropological  discussions  of  property,
including relations to land tenure (Keen 2011), and discussions of Aboriginal relations
to country in the land rights era following the enactment of the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act (1976), and again following the Mabo case and the subsequent
Native Title legislation (Bartlett 1993).
5 The language of rights developed during the evolution of the market economy through
the Early Modern and industrial eras in Britain and other European countries, and is
specific  to  a  particular  social  formation,  albeit  widely  exported  through  colonial
expansion.  Concepts  of  ‘rights’  and  ‘property’  are  contested  in  legal  studies  and
anthropology, however. It is rather extraordinary, then, that concepts whose meanings
have  been taken to  be  so  problematic  are  used by  anthropologists  as  if  they  were
transparent instruments for translating concepts in other cultures. It is also strange
that they appear to have worked so well, although their success may be illusory in the
sense that their use has given rise to distortions and misunderstandings. (Keen 2011)
6 We may go further to argue that the very language of “rights” may be misleading when
used to translate concepts of possession or property cross-culturally, and that it may
bring  about  a  distortion  of  the  ways  in  which  people  use  language  to  constitute
relations of possession (Keen in press). 
 
“Rights” as an anthropological meta-language
7 For the most part anthropologists have construed the concept of “property” in terms of
rights,  obligations  and interests.  Indeed,  the  idea  of  a  “bundle  of  rights”  has  been
proposed  as  the  foundation  for  a  general  approach  to  comparison  (von  Benda-
Beckmann, von Benda-Beckmann, and Wiber 2006; Keen in press).
Von Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) propose that the ‘bundle of rights’ concept can
be used to express the totality of property rights and obligations, or in relation to a
‘master category bundle’ such as private ownership, or particular property objects
such as land, or in relation to valued resources held by a particular person or social
unit. Hann (2007: 308) comments that the ‘rights and obligations associated with
land, the key factor of production, and with concepts of ownership, both collective
and private, can be unpacked with the help of the “bundle” metaphor’ (p.308).
8 By the early twentieth century property was no longer regarded in legal  theory as
‘absolute dominion’, as in Blackstone’s ideal, or as sui generis, but as a disaggregated
‘bundle of rights’. The modern understanding of property as ‘disaggregated’ is traced to
the writings of Hohfeld in the early twentieth century (Hohfeld 1913, 1917; see also
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Gordon 1995:96), although scholars attribute the expression ‘bundle of rights’ to Maine
(Hann 1998). 
9 Nancy Williams study of Yolngu relations to country is a good example of the “rights”
approach to Aboriginal relations to country; she writes of “tenure”, “interests” and
“rights”  held by members  of  “corporate”  groups and their  relatives  among Yolngu
people.
10 The use of the terminology of “rights” as a universal metalanguage is questionable,
however, for it is very much culturally specific. The concept of “rights” interposes a
claimed or attributed capacity or power as an imaginary object between a possessor
and a possession. A right to or in something has the appearance of a kind of possession
in  itself  –  something  a  person  “has”  (Alchian  and  Demsetz  1973).  This  mediating
concept enables the things that possessors can do in relation to a possession to be
differentiated and divided. Where “rights” and related concepts are used as part of a
metalanguage these implications of “rights” may be quite different from, and distort,
the  indigenous  constructions  that  are  constitutive  of  possession  relations  (Keen  in
press).
11 Aboriginal languages seem not to have terms translateable as “rights” – how then do
people  talk  about  what  anthropologists  construe as  rights?  Few ethnographies  give
examples  of  Indigenous  discourse  about  possession,  but  rather  translate  into
anthropologese.  A  rich  source  of  Indigenous  discourse  on  possession  of  country  is
Nicholas Evans’ report written for a Kaiadilt land claim under the Northern Territory
Land Rights Act (Evans 1998; Keen in press).  Drawing on Evans’ work I look first at
Kayardild concepts of possession. (The forthcoming article compares Kaiadilt discourse
of possession with Navaho and Southern Song China.)
 
Kayardild concepts of possession
12 Kayardild,  a  Tangkic  language spoken until  recently  by Kaiadilt  people  of  Bentinck
Island in the Gulf of Carpentaria in northern Australia (Evans 1995, 1998), has few verbs
of possession and no general verb of possession akin to “have”. The verb karrngija,
“keep, keep hold of”, frequently used in discussion of country, can mean “look after”,
“guard”,  and  “be  responsible  for”  something  in  one’s  possession  (Evans  1995:55).
Yolngu use the word dja:ga (“look after”)  in a  similar  way,  as  well  as  ngayathama,
“hold”.
13 Possession in Kayardild is  indicated by possessive pronouns and grammatical  cases,
which denote a variety of possession relations from inalienable to alienable possession.
The simplest construction is apposition – what Evans calls the NOM-NOM frame (Evans
1995, 1998).
14 The relation of the person to parts of the body requires apposition or the NOM-NOM
frame,  and  having  something  on  one’s  person  uses  the  associative  and  perhaps
proprietive cases. As for potentially alienable possession of objects (“ownership”), the
genitive and ablative cases serve for attributive expressions such as “x’s country”, and
the utilative and proprietive cases are used for predicative expressions as in “country-
having  person”  (dulkuru  dangkaa,  countryPROP  manNOM).  In  another  mode  of
indicating  possession  of  country,  individuals  take  the  name  of  a  focal  site  (Evans
1998:96). 
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15 Tables 2 and 3 provide examples of possessive pronouns in Kayardild: “my country”,
“his country”, “my sea”, “my spear”; and of collective possession as in “the country of
my mother’s mothers”, “other people’s food”, “country-owning group”. 
16 There  are  no  Kaiadilt  land-owning groups  akin  to  “clans”,  for  owners  of  the  same
“country”  (dulk)  may  be  connected  to  it  in  a  variety  of  ways  including  spirit
conception, birth, and cognatic descent (Evans 1995). Nevertheless, owners of the same
country are thought of as a single “country-owning group” (dulkuru jardi) rather than
a mere collection of individuals (Evans 1998:53)
 
Kayardild possessions
17 The Kayardild language has no general concept of “property” (Nicholas Evans pers.
com.). The same may be said for Yolngu dialects. Kayardild possessions in the examples
are identified by nominals in NPs that are the direct objects of verbs such as “trespass”
and “steal”. The focus here is on “countries” (dulk) – discrete tracts of land and waters,
including streams, sea, islands, and fish traps (Evans 1998). 
18 Each  dulk  consists  of  an  area  around  a  cluster  of  named  sites,  some  regarded  as
mystically  dangerous.  Like  other  Aboriginal  groups,  Kaiadilt  people  believe  that
ancestral beings created the land as well as animal and bird life, and humans and their
customs, before being transformed into features of the landscape or “story places” that
“bear witness” to these original world-creating exploits (Evans 1995:21). Thus ancestral
creation underwrites the inalienable possession of dulk. Many dulk are named after
single focal sites, and defined by boundaries or edges where one country “cuts off”,
giving way to another, and by lists of places along the coast, paths or creeks, given in
explanations for visitors or neophytes (Evans 1998:63-5, 72). In this way the category
dulk  encompasses  topographical  discourse,  the  identity  of  places,  and  totemic
narratives, under a concept of a unitary object possessed by a group or an individual. 
19 The  enactment  of  possession  relations  includes  both  the  use  of  possessions  and
transactions characteristic of particular possession regimes. Those to do with Kaiadilt
country include succession or inheritance of land and waters, negotiations over the use
of other groups’ countries, and action taken in the event of breaches of norms (Evans
1998).
 
Deontological entailments of possession relations
20 Possession relations are characterised by deontic norms governing possession, and give
it its character.
21 Deontic norms are rules or principles that create obligations and grant permissions and
powers (Keen in press). Some are established by statutes and regulations, while others
are informal and customary. Scholars often associate norms with modal operators such
as “ought” and “must”, but they can be expressed in a variety of ways (Finnemore and
Sikking 1998; Hechter and Opp 2001). Deontic norms (Beller 2008) govern possession
relations and give them their content; these are the deontological entailments of the
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connection between the possessor and the thing possessed. The bases of possession are
recognized, and deontic norms governing possession are current and enforced, within
intersecting and overlapping jural communities of varying scope and power, from the
family to the State (Goodenough 1965; Finnemore and Sikking 1998; Hechter, Opp and
Wippler 2001; Sripada and Stich 2006). Means are required within jural communities to
change norms (Ensminger  and Knight 1997),  to  adjudicate  disputes,  and to  enforce
norms governing possession (e.g. Fehr 2004). 
22 Deontic norms are current and enforced within jural communities of various kinds.
Jural communities in Australian Aboriginal societies are typically kin-based networks
within which people recruited support to protect their interests and to take redressive
action against perceived wrongdoers, now subject of course to structures associated
with  the  nation-State.  This  structure  of  “self-help”  (Berndt  1965)  lay  within  an
overarching regional consensus as to the nature of ancestral law, whose foundation is
attributed to creator ancestors (Keen 2004).
23 Norms governing possession of country in Kayardild have to do with access to and
inheritance of land, waters and their resources (Evans 1998).How do people express
norms about possession and possessions in Kayadild?
 
The expression of norms in Kayardild
24 Verbal  and  nominal  case  are  the  main  means  for  expressing  deontic  modality  in
Kayardild, especially the potential, hortative, desiderative and oblique cases, together
with the counterfactual particle maraka (Evans 1995:264, 428). The examples, which are
mainly about land and waters, include:
Strong prohibition, with the potential inflection in the negative;
Weak prohibition, with the hortative inflection;
Expressions of obligation, with the counterfactual particle maraka;
Conditional constructions, with a deontic modal (in the imperative mood);
Normative Statements linking wrong action to ancestral law in declarative sentences and
quoted questions;
Lexicalisation of wrong action, such as the verb “steal” (Evans 1998).
25 Notice the absence of any terms translated as “rights”.
 
A brief comparison
26 It may be of interest briefly to compare Kayardild constructs of possession with the
other cases in the longer paper.
27 Kayardild lacks a general verb of possession and relies on wide variety of grammatical
cases  to  express  subtle  distinctions  in  varieties  of  possession  relations,  as  well  as
possessive pronouns and apposition. 
28 Navajo also lacks a general possessive verb akin to “own” and “have”,  but employs
possessive pronominal affixes, what is call a “genitive/BE construction” translateable
as “my x exists” (I have a car = my car exists), and certain idioms such as “I pack a gun”
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29 The expression of possession in literary Chinese of the Southern Song includes a “have”
verb (you) and possessive pronouns and particles for kin relations, personal attributes
and possessions.  It  might  be  tempting  to  relate  this  to  the  Song market  economy;
“have” verbs, however, exist in a wide variety of languages, including some Australian
Aboriginal ones (McGregor 2001), which were not associated with market economies
before the British colonisation of Australia.
30 The  three  languages  use  possessive  articles,  pronouns  and  pronominal  affixes  to
identify  possessors,  and  these  extend  to  kinship  relations,  parts  of  the  body,  and
personal attributes. 
31 Kayardild  and  Navajo  have  no  categories  of  possessions  that  can  be  translated  as
“property” in general, although Navaho has terms translateable as “junk” or “stuff’ and
“that  which  I  carry  about”.  Literary  Chinese  has  a  rich  variety  of  property  terms,
concomitant with the role of the market in Southern Song society. 
32 The linguistic  means for expressing norms governing possessions vary between the
three  case  studies.  Kayardild  expresses  deontic  modality  primarily  by  means  of
grammatical case as we have seen. Like Kayardild, Navajo lacks modal auxiliary verbs
(like  “should”  or  “must”),  and  uses  tense  and  various  verbal  idioms  to  express
obligation,  permission  and  prohibition  (such  as  “there  is  space  for”  indicating
permission). Literary Chinese expresses deontic modality by means of verbal auxiliaries
and a particle. There is, however, a striking similarity in the range of expression of
norms about possession in Kayardild and literary Chinese, for example in the use of
expressions such as “according to law” and “that’s the law”. (I could find no examples
of Navaho expression of norms.)
33 The  ontological  correlates  of  possession  also  vary.  The  “consubstantial”  relations
between  people  and  country  typical  of  Aboriginal  cosmologies  (Bagshaw  1998;
Magowan 2001) contrast with the commodification of land in the Southern Song. The
former render land and waters inalienable, as the relation between Pr and Pm becomes
akin to the relation of a person to a part of the body and/or to a kin relationship. This
kind of ontology also pertained in Navajo culture in relation at least to Diné traditional
territory as a whole, reflected in the use-ownership of Navajo land. Land in Southern
Song China was measured, bought and sold, as well as inherited. (In the longer paper I
briefly related these ontologies to Strathern’s critique of the use of the term “property”
for the PNG Highlands.)
 
Conclusions
34 To return to the issue of rights, although the language of rights purports to be able to
accommodate variation in “property” relations cross-culturally, expressed as diverse
“bundles  of  right”  (von  Benda-Beckman,  von  Benda-Beckman  and  Wiber  2006),  an
implication of this talk (and see Keen in press) is that the approach misses the diversity
of conceptualisations and expressions of possession relations. The language of rights
and obligations tries to capture what people can, cannot, must and must not do in
relation  to  things  possessed,  according  to  shared  norms  and  laws.  No  word  or
expression  that  can  be  translated  as  a  “right”  in  the  legal  sense  has  emerged  in
Kayardild,  however  (or  the  other  languages  of  the  comparative  study).  To  express
deontic norms governing possession in terms of rights and obligations would require
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processes of inference and construction. Used as a metalanguage, the language of rights
obscures much of the language and culture of possession relations, and by imposing the
alien concept of abstract rights as mediating possessions, it may well distort what it
describes.  Here  I  have  tried  to  show  how  what  become  construed  as  rights  and
obligations in anthropological and legal discourse are expressed in Kayardild.
35 There is an aspect of Aboriginal relations to country that adumbrates the “bundle of
rights” idea, however, and that is the distribution of relations to country among groups
and relatives of groups (including especially uterine descendants). The bundle of rights
notion distorts these relations, however, through over-specification and rigidity. 
36 The issue is of more than anthropological importance, for the process of recognising
Aboriginal connections to country following Mabo II and native title legislation hinges
on the analysis of connection in terms of “rights”. This is inevitable I suppose, since the
exercise entails the translation of Aboriginal concepts to those of the Common Law
tradition. But in recognising traditional connections, the process inevitably transforms
them. Furthermore, the translation of Aboriginal connection into the language of rights
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